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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this article is to offer a possible interpretation of meanings attached to ruins as image and metaphor 
in Brodsky’s essay writings, or, to be more precise, in Homage to Marcus Aurelius (1994), an essay that sets its 
narrative world in the ruined world that surrounds the narrator, elicits an ambivalent sense of time, and provokes 
complex thoughts of history as an eternal cycle and dialectic process. I will expand the well-established thesis 
according to which Brodsky’s writing is structured on an image of time as irretrievability and irreclaimability, 
which, in his writings, reverberates and re-creates an experience of continuous failure to discipline the memory, 
thus making any return impossible. Moreover, my aim is to show that the approach to Brodsky’s essays from the 
perspective of an analysis of ruins can offer us much more: for example, it can offer valuable insights into his 
understanding of the agency of the authorial modernist voice in literature. Where, in a work of art, is the writer’s 
voice located? What does it mean to see and to write, and what does it mean to read? What role, in this process, is 
assigned to tradition, “eternal values”, and cultural heritage?
Keywords: Iosif Brodsky; ruins; modern subjectivity; textual “I”; Marcus Aurelius
The philosophy of the state, its ethics—not to mention its aesthetics—
are always “yesterday”. Language and literature are always “tomorrow”, 
and often—particularly in the case where a political system is orthodox—
they may even constitute “tomorrow”. (Brodsky, 1987a: 201)
When history piles wreckage upon wreckage, ruins evoke not only 
the buildings from which they hail but also a transhistorical 
iconography of decay and catastrophe, a vast visual archive 
of ruination. (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 1)
1
One of the most influential scholars of ruins in culture and literature, Andreas Schönle, 
maintains that ruins complicate any given clear-cut definition of boundaries, because they 
either blur boundaries or emphasize them: “Both spatially as crumbling structures colonize 
their immediate surroundings, and temporally, as they articulate the overlayering of 
temporalities” (Schönle, 2006: 653; see also Hell, Schönle, 2010: 8). Ruins blur boundaries 
between nature and civilization, between past and present, between the East and the West. A 
notable literary example is Karamzin’s novel Poor Lisa, which sets its narration at the ruins 
of Simonov monastery. As Andreas Schönle further elaborates, the novel could be read as 
a clash of old and new: Lisa represents “old Russia”; Erast, westernized Russia (Schönle, 
2006: 656-657). Because of her tragic destiny, Lisa is sometimes interpreted as “a symbol of 
the victimization of an authentic Russia” (ibid.). The analysis of ruins in Karamzin’s “Poor 
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Liza” laid the foundations for Schönle’s broader cultural analysis of the East–West binary: 
“‘Poor Liza’ clearly sets the terms of a debate about ruins somewhat differently than in 
western Europe. It suggests that Russia’s complex identity as a country sandwiched between 
east and west and as a territory and culture exposed to foreign incursions complicates the 
aesthetization of ruins. <…> Less than a Simmelian reconciliation between nature and 
civilization, they evoke the vulnerabilities of Russian national identity and dramatize the 
ruination it endured over its history” (ibid.: 656). Although the political implications of his 
hypothesis are not irrefutable, it is important that, in the process of art’s creation, ruins can 
indeed release specific energy and creativity (Enderson, in ibid.: 653), as in Karamzin’s story: 
“There, leaning against the rubble of gravestones, I hear the dead moaning of times devoured 
in the abyss of the past—moaning from which my heart shrinks and trembles. <…> All 
this refreshes in my memory the history of the Fatherland—the sad history of those times 
when the rapacious Tatars and Lithuanians plundered with fire and sword the environs of the 
Russian capital, when hapless Moscow, like a defenseless widow, looked to God alone for aid 
in her bitter misfortunes. But most often I am attracted to the walls of the Si... nov Monastery 
by the memory of the deplorable fate of Liza, poor Liza. Ah! I love those objects that touch 
my heart and force me to shed tears of tender grief!” (Karamzin, 1967: 79-80, italics added).
The work of Iosif Brodsky is more than relevant in the context of the analytical axes 
presented in this article: firstly, he was “crossing borders” through his life and in different 
aspects (geographical, cultural, political). But, more importantly, as David M. Bethea 
maintains, Brodsky’s aesthetic vision is “triangular”, as he “constantly looks both ways, both 
to the West and to Russia, and as he continues Mandelstam’s dialogue with Hellenicism. 
His vision can be called triangular in that a Russian source, say Mandelstam, is subtly 
implanted within a Western source, say Dante, so that each source comments on the other, 
but as they do so they also implicate a third source—Brodsky himself” (Bethea, 1994: 49, 
emphasis in original). That “triangular” vision is, as Bethea argues, Brodsky’s signature, so 
to speak (ibid.). However, one border in Brodsky’s poetic and prose imagery seems largely 
impenetrable—that of time, which is especially intriguing if we consider that his approach 
to time determines his worldview: “All my poems are more or less about the same thing—
about Time. About what time does to Man” (Brodsky, 1987b). He viewed life as a “one-way 
street”, and the overriding melancholy in his poetry and prose writings, expressed through 
dense metaphors that sometimes leave the impression of superfluous decor, is to a large 
extent connected to the impossibility to conceive such a return. As he writes in his largely 
programmatic essay Less Than One (1976), “as failures go, attempting to recall the past is 
like trying to grasp the meaning of existence. Both makes one feel like a baby clutching at a 
basketball: one’s palms keep sliding off” (Brodsky, 1986: 3). Moreover, in his poetic vision, 
“visual aspects of life” often mattered more than its content (ibid.: 22). In this essay, his 
admiration for Samuel Beckett recalls a similar description in Marina Tsvetaeva’s story My 
Pushkin: Tsvetaeva’s understanding of Pushkin was built upon Naumov’s famous painting of 
a duel between Pushkin and d’Anthes, which she had seen as a child—before she was able 
to read any of his writings. Brodsky’s similar heuristic pattern is expressed in claims such 
as “I fell in love with a photograph of Samuel Beckett long before I’d read a line of his” 
(ibid.). Moreover, not only does the process of writing rest upon the process of viewing, but 
the viewing itself becomes, like reading, “an act of complicity” (Brodsky, 1995: 275), as he 
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writes in Homage to Marcus Aurelius. To that end, ruins, indeed, as ultimate visual reminders 
of ambivalence of time, of its irreversible and transhistorical nature, occupy an important 
position in his writings, as they are “the triumph of oxygen and time” (Brodsky, 1987b). 
In Joseph Brodsky: A Literary Life, Lev Loseff writes that Leningrad’s “neoclassical 
trappings of empire did more than inspire a basic sense of patriotism” (Loseff, 2011: 12). 
Moreover, Loseff contends, they played a crucial role in Brodsky’s aesthetic development 
by teaching him that he lives “post aetatem nostrum (after our era)” (ibid.: 14), which in 
the end creates an overarching “post-catastrophic” sensibility (Ventslova, 2005: 113) of his 
writings. Furthermore, it could be claimed that ruins serve as an imaginary genius loci for 
his artistic creativity.36 As an “extremely ‘charged’ motif” (Ungurianu, 1996: 176), ruins are 
sometimes understood as the central element in Brodsky’s poetic geography and its complex 
intertextuality (Blacker, 2018). 
The main aim of this paper is to offer a possible interpretation of meanings attached to 
ruins as image and metaphor in Brodsky’s essay writings, or, to be more precise, in Homage 
to Marcus Aurelius (1994), one of his essays that set their narrative world in the ruined 
world that surrounds the narrator, elicit an ambivalent sense of time, and provoke complex 
thoughts of history as an eternal cycle and dialectic process. Departing from the premises that 
ruins emancipate us from social constraints, free the senses and desires, enable introspection, 
and foster creativity, I will expand the well-established (though not indisputable) thesis 
according to which Brodsky’s writings is structured on the image of time as irretrievability 
and irreclaimability, which, in his writings, reverberates and re-creates an experience of 
continuous failure to discipline the memory, thus making any return impossible. Moreover, 
my aim is to show that the approach to Brodsky’s essays from the perspective of the 
analysis of ruins can offer us much more: for example, it can offer valuable insights into 
his understanding of the agency of the authorial modernist voice in literature. Where, in a 
work of art, is the writer’s voice located? What does it mean to see and to write, and what 
does it mean to read? What role, in this process, is assigned to tradition, “eternal values,” 
and cultural heritage? The overarching hypothesis of this article is that ruins in Brodsky’s 
essay writing at the same time mediate his relation to writing activity, revive and perform 
the dichotomy between his empirical and textual “I”, and allow him to explore his approach 
towards modernity—an approach that can be largely summed up by following Calinescu’s 
statement: “True modernism is not historically but only aesthetically forward” (Calinescu 
1987: 83, emphasis in original). 
2
Brodsky’s essay Homage to Marcus Aurelius begins with intriguing and thought-
provoking sentences: “While antiquity exists for us, we, for antiquity, do not. We never did, 
and we never will. This rather peculiar state of affairs makes our take on antiquity somewhat 
invalid. Chronologically and, I am afraid, genetically speaking, the distance between us is too 
immense to imply any causality: we look at antiquity as if out of nowhere” (Brodsky, 1995: 
36 Different scholars argue that Leningrad’s post-war ruins inspired Brodsky’s fondness for the elegy (Schönle, 
2011; see also Rigsbee, 1999). Ruins are, as David Rigsbee maintains, “both image and metaphor through which 
themes of time, memory, loss and exile are explored” (Rigsbee, 1999: 108).
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267, italics added). After the first three chapters, which are rather philosophical and general 
(on the ambivalent nature of time, aesthetics, and the ethics of literature), the plot begins 
with a scene, supposedly in 1981, describing Brodsky’s one of the most vivid encounters 
with Rome after he emigrated. The Equestrian Statue of Marcus Aurelius in Rome, which the 
narrator sees through the window of a taxi, inspire the writer’s creative energy, proving that 
for Brodsky, there is no clear-cut division between acts of seeing and remembering: one often 
“enters” into the other, and vice-versa. The essay also describes another encounter with the 
monument, presumably in the year when the essay was written (or close to that year). Shortly 
before returning to the United States, after “one of the most disastrous evenings in my entire 
life” (ibid.: 292), he and a stray Dalmatian, standing on the square during heavy rain, stare at 
Marcus Aurelius’s statue. For a moment, the narrator transforms into Pushkin’s unfortunate 
hero Evgeniy from Bronze Horseman as he sees that “the shining statue <…> seemed to be 
moving”: “Not at great speed, and not out of this place, but enough for the Dalmatian to leave 
my side and follow the bronze progress” (ibid.: 293). 
These examples show that, firstly, Brodsky puts on the mask (as in his poetry and other 
writings) of a guardian of eternal values in a ruined world: “Mostly left to decay slowly while 
it conserved a modicum of humanist culture, Leningrad in the Soviet years became a single 
extended ruin, which underpinned the identity, poetic voice, and historiographic musings of 
Joseph Brodsky” (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 3). Secondly, he confronts his personal biography 
of a poet in emigration with universal parameters—cultural, historical, and philosophical 
(see also Čilić’s analysis of Herbert’s poetry in: Čilić, 2020: 161). This dichotomy, i.e. the 
double affiliation to both homelands—cosmopolitan, universal, transhistorical, and concrete, 
national (Russian / Soviet), historical—will find its full and analytically intriguing expression 
in the scene describing his Roman encounter with the monument of Marcus Aurelius, which 
foster his childhood memories: “‘Marco Aurelio’, I repeated to myself, and felt as if two 
thousand years were collapsing, dissolving in my mouth thanks to the Italian’s familiar form 
of this Emperor’s name. <…> The Roman! Emperor! Marcus! Aurelius! This is how I knew 
him in high school, where the majordomo was our own stumpy Sarah Isaakovna, a very 
Jewish and very resigned lady in her fifties, who taught us history. Yet for all her resignation, 
when it came to uttering the names of Roman emperors, she’d straighten up, assuming 
an attitude of grandeur, and practically shout, well above our heads, into the peeling-off 
stucco of the classroom well adorned with its portrait of Stalin: Caius Julius Caesar! Caesar 
Octavian Augustus! Caesar Tiberius! Caesar Vespasianus Flavius! The Roman Emperor 
Antoninus Pius! And then—Marcus Aurelius!” (Brodsky, 1995: 270-271). This narrative 
sequence shows that Brodsky reaches out to antiquity in desire to restore and re-create his 
own personal, empirical identity. However, his empirical “I” appears to be beyond the reaches 
because the monument to Marcus Aurelius “unfolds” itself and melds in dense linguistic 
echo: the monument becomes a thick sound metaphor, the ultimate allegory of power (Stalin 
and Caesar), which confirms one seemingly obvious assumption, namely, that all languages 
are figurative before they are mimetic or literal. With this process of the “unfolding” of a 
visual motif in a rich audible allegory of (imperial) power, Brodsky demonstrates that, even 
in his essays, he is primarily a poet (remoteness of his empirical “I” revive the lyrical “I”), 
and therefore aims to turn his readers’ attention to the rhetorical origins of his voice and to 
encourage their critical reception of linguistic representations of any kind and the knowledge 
145
Mundo Eslavo, 19 (2020), 141-152
ARTÍCULOS
they produce and mediate. In other words, he reminds us that, if the words have the ability to 
claim what they didn’t attempt to claim in a first place, empirical “I”, the so-called authentic 
authorial voice, and so-called authentic, objective reality, are not only untrustworthy, but also 
decidedly unattainable. Despite its autobiographical mask, Brodsky’s essay does not seek to 
imitate “the nature of things”, but rather, it strives to re-create, establish, and facilitate new, 
albeit largely inaccessible, realities and meanings. 
One of the meanings that are inaugurated and mediated by unfolding the visual motif 
into an audible allegory of power is associated with Brodsky’s poetics of memory and 
accompanying themes of the nature of an event, aporia of historical knowledge and, in this 
framework, of an individual as an authentic and trustworthy witness of historical events. His 
thoughts about the unreliability of the modernist view of history are shaped by the narrator’s 
asking himself what an ancient Roman would see were he to wake up in our time: “Finding 
himself in our midst, he at best would have a sensation similar to that of a moon landing, i.e., 
not knowing what is before him: the future, or the distant past? A landscape or a ruin? These 
things, after all, have great similarity” (ibid.: 267, italics added). Two conclusions could be 
drawn from these quoted sentences. Firstly, what one sees is always a byproduct of what 
one is able to recognize because history is a construction built around social frameworks 
(Halbwachs claims that “No memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living 
in society to determine and retrieve their recollections,” Halbwachs, 1992: 43), but also that 
the way the narrator remembers is essentially governed by the position he occupies at the 
moment of writing. Or, in the narrator’s own words, “antiquity is above all a visual concept, 
generated by objects whose age escapes definition” (Brodsky, 1995: 282). Secondly, the 
time from which he writes is recognizably Derridian time “out of joint” (in the previous 
example, the narrator writes that “we look at antiquity as if out of nowhere”, ibid.: 267, 
italics added), which is important to emphasize because it provides access to a more profound 
understanding of the authorial voice in the essay: it manifests itself through figures of speech, 
or even through the monument to Marcus Aurelius. The monument to Marcus Aurelius, 
transmuted into an allegory of power, allows the author to withdraw, clearing out the space 
for the inauguration of the textual “I” that will guide the development of the text and whose 
task is to domesticate (false, distorted) images of reality that the empirical “I” has once, as a 
child, adapted: “I suppose, history is best taught in childhood. At the age of twelve one may 
not grasp the intrigue, but a strange sound suggests an alternative reality. ‘Marcus Aurelius’ 
certainly did to me, and that reality proved to be quite vast: larger, in fact, than that Emperor’s 
own. Now apparently came time to domesticate that reality, which is why, I suppose, I was in 
Rome” (ibid.: 271).  The verb “to domesticate” means “to adopt”, “to adapt over time from 
a wild or natural state”, but it also indicates several appropriations: “to make fit for domestic 
life”, or “to bring to the level of ordinary people” (Domesticate). Unlike Tsvetaeva, who in 
her aforementioned essay My Pushkin, for various reasons insisted on her childhood/barbaric 
vision of Pushkin (see, for example, Benčić 2002), Brodsky, surmounted by the personal, 
historical, and collective transhistorical post-war experience of decay and the surrounding 
iconography of ruination, writes about values devoid of any moral content and the instability 
of truths on which the world was built in the first place. 
On the other hand, the writer’s return to the sources of culture is not mere uncritical 
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observing.37 Moreover, this process is not only accompanied by the realization that the past is 
unknowable because the subject is scattered (writing is the space of re-establishing identity, 
and in Brodsky’s essay, his empirical “I” is reenacted into a fully-functional, textual “I”, i.e. 
the narrator), but also by overarching skepticism and the realization that tradition and cultural 
heritage cannot be directly transported and implemented in the present moment, that is, that 
the voices that speak from that source are not prescriptive (Čilić, 2020: 168). Historical figures 
such as Marcus Aurelius and Caesar, to whom Brodsky refers in his essay, have undergone 
significant transformation in this essay’s new, apocryphal version. Recreated, these symbolic 
figures do not appear in their fullness, but only in one dimension which, precisely because 
it is singled out and highlighted, illuminates a certain idea within new circumstances. In the 
essay, Marcus Aurelius is represented as a monument and as the author of Meditations, while 
Caesar is just one in the “rows and rows of marble portraits of <…> emperors, dictators, 
augusti” (Brodsky, 1995: 274), the one that is barely imaginable without a bust, the one that 
would be, in our times, “the most ‘photographed’ person” (ibid.). The illuminating voice 
of tradition is not necessarily the one that is good; sometimes, it is just the opposite (Čilić, 
2020: 168). What makes the essay Homage to Marcus Aurelius unique in the context of 
Brodsky’s essay writings in general, is that in critical listening to the messages of tradition, 
the narrator, despite “moving” historical figures into the new surroundings, analyzes them 
as precise and profound observer in their natural environment, i.e. Rome.38 Therefore, when 
he speaks about coming to Rome to domesticate the reality he first heard about in a Soviet 
school, the narrative voice, in fact, confirms itself as a genuine modernist voice because it 
encourages us to understand it as the one who is “as torn between his urge to cut himself off 
from the past—to become completely ‘modern’—and his dream to found a new tradition, 
recognizable as such by the future” (Calinescu, 1987: 66, italics in original). 
In that context, it is worth asking why this monument (and not any other) attracted the 
writer’s attention in the first place. On the one hand, apart from initiating childhood memories, 
Marcus Aurelius, as one of the most prominent ancient Stoics who did not repudiate public 
service because of his Stoic belief in the obligation to serve, endeavored to harmonize the 
role of a leader with his fondness for art and culture. As we know, for a true stoic, the inner 
voice of conscience is the only rule to follow faithfully. Such a philosophical conception of 
the inner voice as the voice of conscience is close to Brodsky’s philosophical views, and 
Marcus Aurelius in the essay can therefore be read as the only shield against barbarism. After 
all, Marcus Aurelius depicted the Rome of his time as a worn-out and exhausted space. His 
Meditations shaped Brodsky’s understanding that the Roman version of Stoicism “shouldn’t 
be characterized as love of knowledge. It was, rather, a lifelong experiment in endurance, and 
a man was his own guinea pig (a person or thing used as a subject for experiment)” (Brodsky, 
1995: 283). All these ideas closely resonate with Brodsky’s worldview. On the other hand, it 
37 In her recently published monograph Three Faces of the Author. Różewicz, Miłosz and Herbert, Croatian 
scholar Đurđica Čilić recognizes a similar pattern in Zbigniew Herbert’s understanding of cultural heritage, and in 
Miłosz’s construction of the poetic authorial voice. These parallels are not surprising: different scholars depicted 
that the topic of Brodsky’s connection with writers such as Miłosz and Herbert “is a rich one and in need of further 
investigation” (Bethea, 1994: 268). 
38 This natural environment is, as Hell and Schönle emphasize, “one of the most enduring topoi of the ruin 
archive, the theme of the rise and decline of empires” (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 2). 
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is interesting to note that, around the time of Brodsky’s first encounter with the monument, it 
was moved to the Capitoline Museums for conservation reasons (to my knowledge, it has been 
located in the museum ever since)—therefore, the monument Brodsky laid his eyes upon was 
either a dilapidated construction, or the statue’s high-tech copy, a replication of a displaced 
monument. In other words, the monument here functions beyond its traditional function “to 
gather what <…> should be pervasive memory into a single spot” (Young, 1999). When 
Brodsky was looking at the monument, it was rather a counter-monument, one that captures 
the process rather than endurance and which facilitates reflection on the briefness of material 
culture and human life. To that end, the fact that the monument to Marcus Aurelius, dispersed 
into a dense allegory of imperial power (Marcus Aurelius—Stalin—Caesar), shows not only 
that the history is “murderous dialectic process” (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 1), but also that, as 
Walter Benjamin emphasized, the ruin and the allegory share striking similarity because the 
ruin in the realm of things can be understood as the allegory in the realm of thought, “for 
both ruin and allegory speak of a disruption in the relationship between form and meaning” 
(Benjamin, in ibid.: 7, italics added). 
Moreover, the narrator writes later in the essay, “the most definite feature of antiquity 
is our absence. The more available its debris and the longer you stare at it, the more you are 
denied entry. <…> Reaching us intact or in fragments, these things strike us, of course, with 
their durability and tempt us to assemble them, fragments especially, into a coherent whole, 
but they were not meant to reach us. They were, and still are, for themselves” (Brodsky, 
1995: 272, italics added). Quoted sentences resonate with the beginning of the essay: “While 
antiquity exists for us, we, for antiquity, do not. We never did, and we never will. <…> we look 
at antiquity as if out of nowhere” (ibid.: 267, italics added). The most obvious explanation of 
these sentences is that Brodsky at this point debates with one of the main premises of modern 
thought, namely with the idea of modernity as a product of a certain historical development 
(Hunt, 2008: 77). To put it more concretely, Brodsky questions the perception of modernity 
not only as decidedly distinct in its historical superiority over all other times, but also in its 
attempts to aestheticize that seemingly superior status. If the main characteristic of antiquity 
is not its firstness, as Brodsky claims elsewhere in the essay, but, rather, our absence in it, what 
does, in fact, our obsession with antiquity stand for, and what does it symbolize? If antiquity 
and ruins (or, to be more precise, antiquity in ruins) in Brodsky’s essay are born resisting the 
very premises of their birth (they are not resilient and above time, but rather, as Elizabeth 
Blackmar writes, they are “the sheer pictorial allure of vulnerable buildings set against an 
aggressive or indifferent present”, Blackmar, 2001: 324), and if reconfiguring the past is one 
of the premises modernity is largely based on, then Brodsky’s essay exposes modernity’s 
impotence to do precisely all that. The metaphor of a ruined monument to Marcus Aurelius 
abolishes the opposition between civilization and barbarians and shows that the truth does not 
always come under the guise of the aesthetic—it is sometimes envisaged only by its removal: 
“Each new ruination claims to offer a privileged conduit into reality. Does this betray a 
sense that in our digitized world, reality can be apprehended only as destruction?” (Hell, 
Schönle, 2010: 4). Daniel Herwitz’s words, “Nothing is more monumental in the landscape 
of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries than ruins” (Herwitz, 2010: 232), resonate with the 
following from Brodsky’s essay: “Perhaps given the material’s aspiration for permanence, 
the best subject for a monument is indeed destruction” (Brodsky, 1995: 279).    
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How does all of the above-mentioned complement Brodsky’s multifaceted philosophy of 
time? We should look for the answer in another one of Brodsky’s essays, structured around 
classical tradition and the world of so-called classical/eternal values, his Letter to Horace. 
In this essay, the narrator claims, “when one writes verse, one’s most immediate audience is 
not one’s own contemporaries, let alone posterity, but one’s predecessors” (ibid.: 439). In his 
highly complex and perplexed meditations over the nature of time and our obsession with 
firstness (who was the first to discover America; who was the first to set foot on the Moon; 
who fired the first bullet), Brodsky, in fact, disputes modernity’s imperative to encourage the 
politicization of time by fostering an idea that control over time is in anyone’s hands: “Maybe 
we are just better at counting than at thinking, or else we mistake the former for the latter? 
Why is it that we are always so interested in knowing when truth was uttered for the first 
time? Isn’t this sort of archaeology in itself an indication that we are living a lie? In any case, 
if Meditations is antiquity, it is we who are the ruins” (ibid.: 293-294, italics added). The final 
quoted sentence can be understood as a political statement which declares that the 1990s, 
when Brodsky’s essay was in the making, are not a postmodern, but rather a pre-modern 
(or middle-age) condition. The 1990s, after all, were the decay of what was the twentieth 
century’s commanding vision of the future. But I think it is also important to notice Brodsky’s 
insistence on the importance of gaze, of a perspective, in almost all of the aforementioned 
examples (“I first saw this bronze horseman…”, “the longer you stare at (the antiquity)”, 
“Antiquity is above all a visual concept”, ibid.: 285, etc.). In fact, as Julia Hell and Andreas 
Schönle argue, “the beholder defines the ruin” (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 7) in “a playground of 
speculative strategies” (ibid.) and, as such, the beheld risks saying “more about the beholder 
than about the ruin or its individual environment” (ibid.), which often creates new ruins.39 To 
that end, the ruins can also be read as the epitome of modernist subjectivities, scattered and 
split, tragically anchored in the space between the past and the future. Similar to the ruin, 
which “seems to have lost its function or meaning in the present, while retaining a suggestive, 
unstable semantic potential” (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 6), the empirical “I” of the modernist 
identity can be reconstructed only in the textual “I”, which is, as mentioned earlier, always 
figural and never literal, and therefore its rhetorical feature requests a critical reception.40
For this analysis, it is important to emphasize that Brodsky’s usage of the Roman Empire 
is to a large amount related to a different positioning of the writer in emigration. To illustrate 
this, I will turn to an example from Roman Elegies (1981), where, according to Sanna 
Turoma, this new orientation was introduced: “To a homeless torso and its idle, grabby / 
mitts, there’s nothing as dear as the sight of ruins. / And they, in their turn, see themselves in 
the broken Jewish / r no less gladly” (Turoma, 2010: 65)41. Now, unlike before emigration, 
39 In his book Writing Postcommunism: Towards a Literature of the East European Ruins, David Williams 
writes that ruins “are the ultimate exercise in polysemy – signifier and signified often float free” (2013: 2). The fall 
of the Wall, which for the majority represented “the end of the Cold War”, “the end of ideologies”, “the end of his-
tory”, etc., tragically and traumatically “crumbled down” upon the heads of the people in besieged Sarajevo and the 
region (ibid.: 9). 
40 As Hell and Schönle write, “In its ambivalence and amorphousness, the ruin functions as a uniquely flexible 
and productive trope for modernity’s self-awareness. Indeed, it is one of the master tropes of modern reflexivity, pre-
cisely because it encapsulates vacuity and loss as underlying constituents of the modern identity. It is the reflexivity 
of a culture that interrogates its own becoming” (Hell, Schönle, 2010: 6-7).
41 Although it would be rewarding to incorporate more of Brodsky’s poetry in this analysis, it is, however, 
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his lyrical “I” desires to situate himself “at the center of the imperial space and history of 
classical Rome” (ibid.: 64), indicating that the marginalized poet, with a broken Jewish r, 
finds his impossible home by looking at Roman ruins. Moreover, in the above-mentioned 
essay Homage to Marcus Aurelius, the question of what Mieke Bal in The Laughing Mice 
assigns to as “narrative embedding”, is paramount. Just to recall shortly, Bal explains her 
theory of narrativity with the analysis of seventh century Arjuna’s penance: “The elements of 
this sign, the standing Arjuna, the standing cat, the laughing mice, only have spatial relations 
to one another. The elements of the fabula—Arjuna assumes a yoga position, the cat assumes 
a yoga position, the mice laugh—do not form a coherent significance as such. The relation 
between the sign (the relief) and its content (the fabula) can only be established by meditation 
of an interjacent layer, the view of the events. The cat sees Arjuna. The mice see the cat. The 
spectator sees the mice who see the cat who has seen Arjuna. And the spectator sees that the 
mice are right” (Bal, 1981: 203). The narrative trigger in Brodsky’s essay was the narrator’s 
gaze at the statue of Marcus Aurelius through the windshield of a taxi, and, later, during his 
last encounter with Rome, when he and middle-sized Dalmatian “For a while <…> both 
stared at the horseman’s statue” (Brodsky, 1995: 292). To that end, the meaning of the claim 
according to which “for antiquity, we do not exist” becomes clearer, hence antiquity equals 
“standing Arjuna”, who—despite attracting attention—cannot see anything on his own, and 
therefore cannot offer an answer or a solution because he himself is—in fact—pure effect of 
rhetorical stance. 
In Homage to Marcus Aurelius, Brodsky writes directly of the importance of gaze, 
of a perspective, and even reclaims awareness that the relation between embedding and 
embedded elements is hierarchical.42 For example, “Nothing exists for the future’s sake; 
and the ancients couldn’t in nature regard themselves as the ancients. Nor should we bill 
ourselves as their tomorrow” (ibid.: 272). Or, “As absorbing as Roman antiquity appears 
to be, perhaps we should be a bit more careful with our retrospective proclivity. What is 
man-made chronology but a self-fulfilling fallacy, a means of obscuring the backwardness 
of one’s own intelligence? What if it’s just a way of justifying the snail’s pace of the species’ 
evolution? <…> What if our concept of antiquity, for example, is but the switching off of an 
alarm clock?” (ibid.: 293). As the narrator continues to look at Marcus Aurelius, the mirroring 
of Leningrad’s Bronze Horseman (i.e., Peter the Great) and Rome’s Bronze Horseman (i.e., 
Marcus Aurelius) becomes a mergence; time and material, antiquity and ruin become one, 
and it becomes clear that time is not structured as a nonreplicable progression, but, instead, 
as a repository of repeatable events, material objects, and subjectivities: “So in the end you 
are bound to recognize yourself in one of them. For there is no Caesar without a bust, as there 
is no swan without a reflection. Clean-shaven, bearded, bald, or well-coiffed, they all return 
a vacant, pupil-free, marble stare, pretty much like that of a passport photo or the mug shot 
of a criminal” (ibid.: 273-274). 
beyond the scope of a single paper. 
42 I’m grateful to my colleague, Tanja Petrović (Institute of Culture and Memory Studies, Research Centre of 
the Slovenian Academy of Sciences), for sharing her thoughts about the importance of gaze in the analysis of ruins. 
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3. Conclusion
Ruins in Brodsky’s essay verbalize and materialize the deeply complex dichotomy 
of Brodsky’s empirical and textual “I”, which is especially challenging due to the multi-
perspectivity of his personal gaze: Brodsky was at once a Soviet, a Russian, an emigree, and 
a citizen of the twentieth century. Ruins express his displaced authorial position, but they are 
also an attempt to draw his personal experience from a zone of destruction and pain. Ruins in 
Brodsky’s eyes tell narratives (they are both a verbal and visual trope), and memory operates 
largely by means of these visualizations. Ruins are also profoundly narrative, since they 
plot out Brodsky’s image of temporality—they can be read as allegories that question and 
eventually cancel out modernistic “utopia of freedom and progress, linear time and geometric 
space” (Huyssen, 2006: 19). At the same time, with an analysis of ruins as an image and as 
a metaphor, I questioned the widely accepted assumption that Brodsky’s philosophy of time 
reverberates his desire to return to the beginning (or, as I have mentioned earlier, his dream of 
finding a new tradition, recognizable as such). His intense search for the beginning (Christmas 
Poems are often interpreted as the poet’s passionate search for the beginning) gives rise to 
overarching melancholy and nostalgia in his works. My analysis shows that things are more 
complicated than that. The defining pathos of Brodsky’s worldview lies in the impossibility 
of return not because of the tragic irreversibility of time, but because temporality is not a set 
of clearly marked transitions to begin with: it does not derive from objective properties of 
events and the relations between them, but rather from subjective responses to such events 
(Evans 2005: 21). Also, if culture, in its ethical and aesthetical being, has temporal direction, 
then it is always “reverse temporality”—humanity does not progress from worse to better 
to best. Ruins and antiquity—or, to be more precise, antiquity in ruins—in Brodsky’s essay 
make this dense and complex temporal philosophy visible. Finally, I believe that Brodsky’s 
writings, observed from this perspective, reclaim the vision of literature as always “a form of 
cultural traveling, a means of transporting words into other worlds, of making crossings and 
forging connections between apparently conflicting worlds” (Susheila, 2004: 6). 
When the narrator writes that “Nothing exists for the future’s sake; and the ancients 
couldn’t in nature regard themselves as the ancients. Nor should we bill ourselves as their 
tomorrow” (Brodsky, 1995: 272), he is in fact making a double statement: on the one hand, 
when the writer dies, he will be outlived by his voice (written words are timeless, and 
therefore, the equivalent of pure transcendence); on the other hand, the modernist subject, 
enclosed in skepticism towards himself and in the world that surrounds him, can offer in his 
literary work no more than an illusion of meaning because authentic meaning is irretrievably 
lost and decidedly unattainable in the delayed figurability of seeing, imagining, writing, and 
creating. 
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